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Recent Developments

Werbowsky v. Collomb:
Futility Exception Remains Applicable but Only Where Irreparable Harm Caused
by a Demand or Direct Conflict Precluding Good Faith is Clearly Demonstrated
By Danielle C. Grilli
n its first examination of the
issue since 1968, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland
held that the futility exception
to the requirement that a
demand be made upon directors
as a prerequisite to instituting a
derivative action is only
applicable when the majority of
directors in a corporation are so
directly conflicted that they cannot
be expected to operate within the
confines of the business judgment
rule, or if a demand or delay in
receiving a response could cause
irreparable harm to a corporation.
Werbowsky v. Co/lomb, 362
Md. 581,766 A.2d 123 (2001).
The court concluded that directors
who served on the boards ofboth
the company and its controlling
corporate shareholder were not
so conflicted that they would
respond adversely to a demand
by minority stockholders to
investigate whether a business
transaction was in the best interest
of the company. The court
considered the alternatives to the
futility exception proposed by
other
jurisdictions
and
organizations, but reiterated its
support of the futility exception in
limited application.
Lafarge Corporation
("Lafarge") is a corporation
chartered in Maryland. Lafarge

I

S.A. ("LSA") is a French
corporation that is the majority
stockholder of Lafarge. LSA
began planning an acquisition of
the UK company Redland PLC.
LSA asked Lafarge in 1996 if it
was interested in any ofRedland's
American or Canadian assets,
which Lafarge declined. Bertrand
Co11omb ("Co11omb") was serving
as Chairman of the Board of
Directors for both Lafarge and
LSA and as CEO of LSA. After
the start ofLSA's hostile takeover
of Redland in October 1997,
Collomb advised the Lafarge
directors that upon successful
takeover ofRedland, LSA would
again offer them some of
Redland 's Canadian and
American assets. The board
concluded that to consider LSA's
offer, it would be necessary to
assign a special committee of
independent directors.
Lafarge assigned five of its
directors to the special committee
and authorized them to review the
proposal by LSA. The special
committee then selected the firm
ofWarburg Dillon Read ("Dillon
Read"), as its investment banking
advisor.
Dillon
Read
recommended that Lafarge
acquire several assets which LSA
had acquired in the takeover of
Redland, PLC. Members ofthe

special committee met with
Collomb and agreed to a price of
$690 million. Subsequently, the
committee approved the
arrangement by adopting a
resolution that Lafarge's board
accepted the next day. The price
was not to exceed $690 million.
This suit was filed on March
18, 1998, one day after the
transaction was announced, with
no prior contact or demand made
upon Lafarge or its directors. The
suit was initially brought by the
owner of only twenty shares of
Lafarge, a company which, since
1994, had filed sixty-four other
shareholder lawsuits against
various corporations. The suit
was filed well after the transaction
in question had commenced.
An amended complaint was
filed asserting that Lafarge
overpaid for the Redland assets
by between $165 and $210
million. The complaint also
claimed that pre-suit demands
upon the directors would have
been futile since 1) the majority
of the supposedly independent
directors "actively participated in
the wrongful conduct" that was
the immediate result of their gross
negligence in failing to recognize
the potential harms of the deal
with LSA; 2) the directors had an
incentive to accommodate LSA
31.2 U. Bait. L.F. 31
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in order to maintain their
positions in light of LSA' s
control over Lafarge, and the
directors were substantially
compensated for their duties
and 3) due to language in the
liability insurance policies of
both the directors and officers,
the corporation would not be
allowed to bring action against
the directors. The defendants
responded to the amended
complaint with a motion to
dismiss based , among other
reasons, on plaintiff's failure to
make demand on the directors
for remedial action. The motion
to dismiss was denied.
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County noted the lack of
Maryland law on this issue and
relied heavily on a test articulated
by Delaware law. In applying this
test to the evidence presented, the
circuit court concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish a
reasonable doubt that the
directors lacked independence
and granted summary judgment for
the defendants.
The Court of Appeals began
its analysis by stating that the
nature of a derivative suit has two
parts, "First, it is the equivalent of
a suit by the shareholders to
compel the corporation to sue.
Second, it is [a] suit by the
corporation, asserted by the
shareholder on its behalf, against
those liable to it." /d. at 600, 766
A.2d at 133. The court then
posited that due to the intrusive
nature of a derivative suit on
managerial authority, the law
31.2 U. Bait L.F. 32

attaches a prerequisite to filing
this type of suit.
/d.
Interpreting Maryland law in
Kamen v. Kemper, 500 U.S. 90,
95-97 (1991), the Supreme
Court enunciated that a
Maryland pre-suit demand in a
derivative
action
is
a
substantive requirement /d. at
601, 766 A.2d 134. It is established that courts will not hear a
derivative action by a stockholder
on behalf of a corporation until it
is shown that all ofhis remedies
are exhausted in the corporation
and a demand upon the
corporation to pursue the suit was
denied or ignored. /d. at 602, 766
A.2d at 135-36 (citing Parish v.
Milk Producers Ass 'n, 250 Md.
24, 81-82, 242 A.2d 512, 544
( 1968)). The one exception to this
rule is that demand is not required
if it would be futile.
Although it has been codified
in a minority of jurisdictions, the
futility exception remains primarily
a creature of the common law in
most jurisdictions, including
Maryland. /d. at 602, 766 A.2d
at 135. Because the court has not
considered this issue since Parish
in 1968, it reviewed both
statutory and common law
developments in other states since
that decision. The court believed
that the trend subsequent to
Parish "has been to enforce more
strictly the requirement of pre-suit
demand and at least to
circumscribe, if not effectively
eliminate, the futility exception."
/d. at607, 766A.2dat 137. The
court next considered the

Delaware test used by the lower
court, but called it "an exacting
requirement" and declined to
follow it. /d. at *46-47, *61-62.
The court discussed the "flat
universal demand requirement"
posited by the American Bar
Association and the American
Law Institute and contained in
section 7.42 of the Model
Business Corporation Act
("Act"). /d. at 611, 766 A.2d at
140. The Act provides that in
order to commence a derivative
suit, a shareholder must make a
written demand upon the
corporation "to take suitable
action" and a ninety-day period
must expire from the date the
demand was made unless the
shareholder has already been told
that the demand was rejected by
the corporation or irreparable
injury to the corporation would
result by waiting ninety days. /d.
at 611-612, 766 A.2d 140.
The court stated that
although there "is much to be said
for the ABA/ALI approach" that
calls for the elimination of the
futility exception to the demand
requirement, the court declined to
make it a part of its common law
because it represents a "radical
departure from our current
common law" and is a change that
should be decided by legislative
hearings. /d. at 617-618, 766
A.2d 143. The court emphasized
the importance of the demand
requirement and noted that "presuit demand is not an onerous
requirement." /d. at 619, 766
A.2d 144.
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The court held that, for
now, it would continue to
utilize the futility exception, but
would follow the current trend
of other jurisdictions and hold
that it is a limited exception. /d.
at 620, 766 A.2d at 144. In order
to apply the futility exception,
allegations or evidence must
clearly establish "in a very
particular manner" that either:
( 1) a demand, or a delay in
awaiting a response to a
demand, would cause irreparable
harm to the corporation, or (2) a
majority of the directors are so
personally and directly conflicted
or committed to the decision in
dispute that they cannot
reasonably be expected to
respond to a demand in good
faith and within the ambit of the
business judgment rule." /d.
Plaintiffs raised two
objections to the decision of the
circuit court: first, that the court
erred by deciding the futility issue
on summary judgment after
deciding that the amended
complaint raised the issue
adequately, and second, that the
evidence, on a summary judgment
standard, was sufficient to show
futility. /d. at 620, 766 A.2d at
144-45. The court of appeals
affirmed the lower court and
rejected both complaints stating
that although the futility issue is
often raised in a motion to
dismiss, it is not required to be
decided only at that point. /d. at
620-21, 7 66 A.2d at 145. With
regard to the futility issue, the
court found that the plaintiffs had

not
produced
sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the
directors of Lafarge were
conflicted or controlled by LSA
so extensively that demand
upon them would have been
futile.
The holding of the court of
appeals is significant because it is
the first time the court has rendered an opinion on this issue
in over thirty years. More
importantly, although the court
states that it is not changing the
common law, this decision is a
radical departure, in spirit if not
in letter, from the court's more
liberal treatment of the issue in
Parish v. Milk Producers Ass 'n.
With this decision, the court
appears to have become hostile to
the futility exception, and comes
very close to eliminating it
altogether. Given the strict nature
of the newly formulated limitation,
perhaps they have.
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